The war in Mozambique is getting worse and Maputo can’t handle it

In my last column, I examined how the current conflict in Mozambique’s province of Cabo Delgado had come into being. The Islamist insurgency is driven by both local and international factors.

On the local side, to quote Mozambique specialist Joseph Hanlon, “Cabo Delgado . . . is not the poorest province, but it has the highest inequality, highest illiteracy rates, highest school malnutrition, lowest access to health facilities, worst housing, and fewest children in school. There is severe poverty”. And, on the international side, the local Islamists have pledged allegiance to “Islamic State” (IS). Further, as US Special Operations Command Africa commander Major General Dagvin RM Anderson has pointed out, the increase in the insurgents’ capabilities and aggressiveness, plus their adoption of IS techniques and procedures, suggests that they have received foreign help.

Infiltrating into Cabo Delgado from the Middle East is entirely practical. There are innumerable dhows and other small craft sailing up and down the coast of East Africa, and across to and back from the Arabian Peninsula. And, between Cape Agulhas and the Horn of Africa, there are only two navies worthy of the name – the Kenyan and South African. If a vessel does not arouse the suspicions of the international naval patrols in the Arabian Sea, or the Kenyan Navy, it has plain sailing all the way to Cabo Delgado. Both weapons and “fighters” can be infiltrated in this way.

The situation in Cabo Delgado has deteriorated alarmingly rapidly. In August, the Islamists stormed the small coastal port town of Mocímboa da Praia. They are still holding it. They have launched attacks on offshore islands, showing they have boats and know how to use them. There have been all too many reports of women and children being abducted. More recently, the Islamists overran the Muidumbe district (and perhaps Muidumbe town itself; news is difficult to get). They then perpetrated an appalling massacre, including (but not limited to) the beheading 40 to 50 people. Those who were beheaded included teachers, local chiefs and teenage boys caught participating in initiation rituals. Rumours that the Islamists were next going to attack Mueda caused people, including Frelimo party officials, to flee that town and district.

Although the Mozambican government claims that the Defence and Security Forces (abbreviated to FDS in Portuguese) have scored successes against the insurgents, these claims lack credibility. (That Frelimo party officials fled Mueda tells you all you need to know about those claims.) Instead, there have been too many reports of the FDS harassing local people and extorting money from them. There have also been reports of torture by the FDS. Claims that the FDS has killed large numbers of insurgents also lack credibility. The fear is that many of these were civilians. “They (FDS) are confusing terrorists with local communities. This creates a distance between the forces and the population, and brings the victims closer to the bandits,” said Daviz Simango, president of the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), mayor of Beira and a member of the Council of State, after a visit to the north. Another irrefutable piece of evidence of the ineffectiveness of the FDS is the emergence of unofficial local defence militias, particularly among the Makonde people. And then there is the Mozambican government’s attempts to use security contractors to help fight the war, but this is too little, too late.

So what now? First, the initiative is with the Islamists and will remain with them for months to come, quite probably for more than a year and maybe even the next two years. But don’t assume that having the initiative will translate into more and more spectacular attacks (although these might happen) because, second, a war like this is all about control of the population, not control of the territory. In conflicts like this, a government flag can fly over a town, there can be government forces in it, yet the population can be under the control of the insurgents, by means of an underground network. For the insurgents, maintaining the initiative can be all about consolidating control over the population and using atrocities to drive out those communities who would never accept such control. Third, the giant oil and gas projects off the coast of Cabo Delgado are definitely in danger. Their shore facilities are now (or very soon will be) effectively cut off from all land communications. What will happen when the insurgents obtain mortars and start standoff bombardments of those facilities? And the insurgents have boats, so each and every one of the offshore gas rigs will have to be protected, requiring aircraft and boats. Security costs are going to go through the roof. Fourth, defeating such an insurgency in a marginalised rural region requires an integrated military, police, intelligence and socioeconomic development (including health, education and infrastructure construction) strategy and programme, all the elements of which are equally important. A purely military response will fail. And fifth, this is clearly currently far beyond the capacity of the Mozambican government; it needs foreign help, especially when it comes to air support (particularly helicopters) and naval patrols.

But from where? Don’t expect France to help, except maybe through military contractors directly defending the oil and gas facilities. The French armed forces are too heavily committed elsewhere. Outgoing US President Donald Trump is disengaging American forces from Afghanistan, Iraq and reportedly Somalia. Incoming President Joe Biden is unlikely to reverse this. Britain might give support to Tanzania (which is already suffering the ‘spillover’ from Cabo Delgado) and Malawi (coincidently, British troops are in Malawi already) but it is unlikely to get involved in Mozambique.

Like it or not, everyone is going to look at South Africa. After all, the insurgency represents a security threat to the entire region. But the South African National Defence Force has been neglected for 20 or more years. Lack of spare parts means that the serviceability of the South African Air Force’s (SAAF’s) aircraft and the South African Navy’s ships is low. Much of the South African Army has equipment that is now obsolete. Moreover, who is going to provide all the complementary (police, socioeconomic) capabilities? How is command and control going to be organised with Mozambique? And where is the money going to come from? Big questions indeed. To start, South Africa needs to invest R10.5-billion in the SAAF, not South African Airways.