Musings on the local aerospace and defence industries

Last week saw the latest edition of Africa Aerospace and Defence, still the continent’s premier exhibition in this sector, attracting exhibitors and visitors from all over the world. And, naturally, drawing one’s thoughts to the state of the closely related but not identical aerospace and defence industries in South Africa.

Of course, these industries were once much larger in South Africa than they are today. But that was an abnormal development, undertaken by the then apartheid government during the 1970s and 1980s to equip the then South African Defence Force (now the South African National Defence Force) against growing threats and to neutralise the effects of the 1977 United Nations Security Council arms embargo on the country (which was lifted in May 1994).

That industry grew to unsustainable proportions. There were times when those involved seemed to lose sight of reality. I remember – and it is a memory, so possibly erroneous, but still, I have it lodged in my mind – that when the Americans unveiled the world’s first operational stealth combat aircraft, the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk, Armscor (then responsible for both the manufacture as well as the acquisition of defence material, including weapons, thereby being in a constant conflict-of-interest situation) soon rushed out a design of a South African stealth aircraft, code-named Flowchart. It turned out that the Flowchart was actually a wind-tunnel model (it was, and hopefully still is, on display at the South African Air Force Museum in Centurion/Tshwane). To this day, the incident is puzzling, except as a propaganda exercise. (Stealth aircraft are extremely expensive –beyond South Africa’s means – because they have to merge the very different imperatives of stealth and aerodynamics.)

The end of the wars in Southern Africa, and the 1990–1994 reform era, leading to full democracy from 1994 onwards, necessitated a huge cut in the defence budget, which hit the local aerospace and defence industries hard. But it was unavoidable. However, it might have been done better: certainly, a sudden decrease in funding hit the Rooivalk attack helicopter programme hard, slowed it up significantly, and probably fatally damaged its export prospects. One very good development of that era was the separation of State-owned aerospace and defence manufacturing from acquisition during 1992. The manufacturing activities were grouped together as Denel, while acquisition kept the name Armscor.

Since then, a general pattern has emerged. Those South African aerospace and defence companies that are now majority-owned by foreign groups, or have managed to entrench themselves into the supply chains of global majors, or have developed partnerships or joint projects with other governments, have been doing pretty (in some cases, very) well. Those that depend on South African acquisitions are going badly. This latter group includes a lot of small businesses, including black-owned businesses. And I have heard more than one story of small businesses in grave danger of going under because government agencies or State-owned Denel have simply failed to pay them. Denel, of course, has been entangled in the gigantic State capture corruption scandal that has convulsed the country.

More recently, there has also been some good news regarding Denel. Earlier this month, India removed the company from its blacklist of companies that were not allowed to do business with the Indian State. And, as reported elsewhere in this edition, the guided firing trials of the Denel Dynamics A-Darter missile have been successfully concluded. Perhaps because of its international links (most notably with Brazil and the United Arab Emirates), Denel Dynamics seems to have been less entangled in State capture (although undoubtedly still affected by it).

But there remains an atmosphere of anxiety surrounding the local aerospace and defence sector. State budgets remain too low to properly fund the projects the local industry has conceived and that the Defence Force and civil government agencies desire. Projects proceed slowly, kept just alive, and in danger of delivering products that, while functional, will be behind the technological curve when delivered, and thus of no interest to potential export customers. In certain key niche areas, such as unmanned air vehicles (UAV), South Africa has gone from being one of the world leaders to a follower – still designing and producing technologically competitive designs, but no longer a pace-setter. The UAV sector is very dynamic, with lots of countries putting lots of money into developing their own indigenous UAV design and manufacturing industries. How long will South Africa be able to hold its own in such a global environment?

And there are other issues too. It might come as a surprise to many, but South Africa has a civil aviation manufacturing industry, designing and building aircraft. Oh, it is small, and it is niche – gliders, sports aeroplanes, general aviation types. But it could be much bigger than it is. Why isn’t it? One key reason is that the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) simply does not have the capacity to certify new aircraft types, and improved versions of existing types, at anything more than a snail’s pace. It needs more experts in this field, but does not, I believe, have the budget to recruit, train and adequately pay such people. The SACAA is an agency of the Department of Transport, so the responsibility for this failure ultimately vests in the various Ministers of Transport that the country has had over the past 24 or so years.

There needs to be better coordination between the departments of Transport, Trade and Industry, and Science and Technology, to ensure that the correct regulatory and support frameworks are in place to allow South Africa’s private sector civil aircraft manufacturing industry to develop, have certified, and market, their products on a larger scale. This would not require much in the way of government funds.

On the defence side, if there is to be no increase in defence spending, then a good hard look is going to have to be given to the missions, structure and size of the Defence Force, and what technologies it can afford to fund locally. All else would then have to be abandoned. And those local aerospace and defence companies not already focused on exports must go foreign – or they will go under.